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Abstract 
 
 
Assuming that structural funds are the catalyser of new 
forms of governing within the member states, this paper 
focuses on the Europeanisation process through the 
comparison of three cases of implementation of the 
INTERREG programme for cross-border co-operation. 
It questions the legal and cognitive capacities of the 
European Commission to make converge the regional 
and sub-regional actors toward the constitution of 
multi-level networks mobilised for the territorial 
development. It is argued that the translation of the 
action of the Commission depends on the capacity of 
institutionalisation of interests and ideas at the border 
local level.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is commonly assumed that the rise of the European integration has given way to new forms 
of governing within the member states. Some authors believe that the administrative activity 
of member states would converge toward a common model defined by the authorities of the 
European Union (Hassenteufel, Surel, 2000: 8-24).  
This paper tries to shed a new light on the process of convergence encouraged by the 
European Commission. More specifically, it focuses on the European incentives for cross-
border relations between French and Spanish sub-national authorities. Since the Single 
European Act (SEA) came into force on 1 January 1993, cross-border co-operation has grown 
appreciably in Europe (Anderson, O’Dowd and Wilson, 2002: 1-12). This phenomenon can 
be defined as ‘all types of negotiated actions between the public institutions of, at least, two 
neighbouring countries. These negotiated actions must take place within the border territories 
of these states in order to reinforce the relations of these states and of their territorial 
institutions by all the means possible’ (Pérez González, 1993: 545-564). The European 
Commission promotes it through a specific policy called INTERREG which provides public 
funds to local cross-border projects which have a positive impact on employment, 
environment protection, culture and gender equality. This paper concentrates on the first part 
(2000-2003) of this programme. The case of the Franco-Spanish border is interesting because 
it is one of the symbols of the French and Spanish sovereignty, but at the same time, it 
constitutes a peripheral territory which depends on the structural funds. Then, the Pyrenees 
can be considered as a political arena of confrontation between two logics of territorial 
development: a top-down state-centred logic and a multi-level logic through the implication 
of the European Commission at the local level (Sodupe, 1990: 58-8). 
The study of European integration through cross-border relations is divided into four 
‘schools’ (Smith, 1995; Philippart, Van Cutsem, 1999: 789-808). On one hand, the neo 
functionalists focus on the overtaking of the nation-state model through a spill-over process 
produced by the economic integration of the continent. In a similar way, the federalists 
interpret the European integration as the multiplication of intermediary levels of governance 
and specially as the rising of the regional level. On another hand, the intergovernmentalist 
authors stress the importance of state bargaining and consider the structural funds as a side-
payment of poor states allowing the completion of other policies by rich states. Finally, the 
scholars who observe Europe through the framework of the international political economy 
deduce that the European funds serve the setting of a global capitalist market by filling the 
gap between poor and rich areas. 
My contribution is based on three case studies selected for their representativeness1 in the 
western, central and eastern parts of the Pyrenees (cf. map). It is intended to be a comparative 
analysis whose purpose is to demonstrate how and why the legal and cognitive dimensions of 
the European regional policy tend to favour the convergence of regional and sub-regional 
actors toward a multi-level network mobilised for the territorial development. Through a 
‘calculus approach’ of historical neo institutionalism (Steinmo, 1992), I question the neo 
functionalist hypothesis of diffusion of the European standards promoted by the European 
Commission to the sub-national level. These standards consist in a multi-level governance 
logic of implementation and a modern conception of local development based on training, 
local networking and quality production.  
This paper is based on the Ph.D on which I am working as a researcher of the department 
of Social and Political Sciences of the European University Institute of Florence. I collected 
the empirical data during the first part of the INTERREG programme, from 2000 to 2003, 
through 40 interviews with the private and public actors involved in the three cases I selected.
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This article is made of four parts. The first step sets out the way the INTERREG III-A 
policy emerged from the European political space. The second section describes the evolution 
of the Franco-Spanish border policy. In the third part, the three case studies are presented. 
After that, the comparison is used to investigate the outcomes and the causes of the 
implementation of the INTERREG programme in these border areas. Finally, I conclude with 
some related theoretical considerations. 
 
 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF A SPECIFIC EUROPEAN CROSS-BORDER POLICY 
 
INTERREG did not appear in 1988 as if by magic. It emerged progressively and required the 
mobilisation of many actors. The signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 increased 
the importance of structural funds at the national borders.  
 
2.1. The Genesis of European Cross-Border Policies  
 
According to R. Sunnen (1970: 297-321), just as monsieur Jourdain in Molière’s The Would-
Be Gentleman, until the 1980s the European Economic Communities (EEC) produced cross-
border policies without being conscious of it. 
However, this analysis is incomplete. Borders were mentioned during the Conference of 
Messine (1955) but simply as a limit to the free market and to economic growth. At that time, 
the European Coal and Steel Community carried out research on border regions such as the 
Saar and Lorraine. Nevertheless, these investigations were undertaken to help the industrial 
conversion of these areas and not because of their status as border regions.  
From the end of 1960s, border regions began to constitute a subject of political interest, 
but only at the discursive level. In 1968, the president of the Directorate General XVI (today 
DG Regio) when addressing the European Parliament stated that ‘border regions deserve the 
whole attention of communities’. On 9 October 1981 and 19 June 1984 the European 
Commission enjoined member states to promote cross-border co-operation but this did not, of 
itself, oblige member states to take any particular action.  
The supporters of border regions had to re-direct their claims toward alternative fora. 
Three institutions recognised the right of border regions to be heard. The first was the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development which was committed to fighting 
against cross-border pollution. The second was the Council of Europe and the Permanent 
Conference of Local and Regional Authorities who proposed a juridical framework with the 
European Outline-Convention of Transfrontier Co-operation Between Territorial 
Communities or Authorities on 21 May 1980 (Council of Europe, 1980). The third was the 
Association of European Border Regions, a member of the Assembly of European Regions, 
which still produces a large number of surveys about border areas (Assembly of European 
Regions, 1992) and monitors the LACE network (Linkage Assistance and Co-operation for 
the European Border Regions). Despite active lobbying, the expertise of these institutions was 
not sufficient to include their claims on the EEC agenda 
 
2.2. The Reform of Structural Funds and the Institutionalisation of INTERREG 
 
The signature of the SEA in 1986 allowed the taking into consideration of border regions in 
the EEC agenda. Although the EEC authorities had cautiously considered the claims of border 
regions prior to 1988, the fear of an economic crisis in the border areas and the appointment 
of more receptive commissioners made the European Commission more open to the double-
discourse of the advocates of border regions: on one hand, border regions needed economic 
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compensation to deal with the opening of borders; on the other hand, these areas had great 
potential for economic development. 
The reform of structural funds in 1988 constituted a watershed for cross-border issues. In 
1989, INTERREG was implemented as a pilot action, financed through Article 10 of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In 1990, it was integrated in the community 
initiatives. These were special programmes established by the European Commission to act 
directly with sub-national actors according to a ‘bottom-up’ logic (Hooghe and Keating, 
1994: 367-393). The financial and political weight of INTERREG progressively increased 
while the number of initiatives was reduced. During the first programming period (1990-
1993) INTERREG I contributed the lion’s share of the 14 initiatives and cost 1,000 million 
Ecu, from a total spending of 5,500 million Ecu. After the re-launch of 1993, the INTERREG 
II budget grew to 2,900 millions Ecu, from a total of 14,379 million Ecu for 13 initiatives 
(1994-1999). Following the Berlin European Council (1999), community initiatives were 
reduced to four. Despite these reductions, € 4,875 million were allocated for INTERREG III 
(2000-2006), from a total of € 10,442 million (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 243).  
Nowadays, INTERREG III is divided into three strands: strand A is dedicated to co-
operation in transfrontier regions (regions with a common border); strand B promotes 
transnational co-operation (regions without common border but in the EU); and strand C is 
related to the interregional co-operation (regions all around the world).  
 
 
3. THE PROGRESSIVE OPENING OF THE FRANCO-SPANISH BORDER 
 
Defined for the first time in 1659 by the Treaty of Pyrenees, the Pyrenean border was 
definitely established in 1862 and strictly ruled by the states. Although local cross-border 
agreements, called faceries, have existed since the Middle-Ages, the implementation of cross-
border co-operation policies since the mid-1980s represents a departure from the general trend 
of Franco-Spanish relations toward a more open cross-border type of governance based on 
authorities of different tiers.  
 
3.1. The Puzzle of the Franco-Spanish Cross-border Co-operation  
 
Until the devolution process of the late 1970s, cross-border relations were ruled by sectoral 
agreements controlled by national governments. In 1875, an International Franco-Spanish 
Commission (IFSC) was set up to adjudicate in disputes related to fishing in the border river 
Bidasoa. Progressively swallowing up the other cross-border sectoral agencies, the IFSC 
remained the largest association until (Fernández de Casadevante, 1990).  
In France, the right of local and regional tiers of government to implement their own 
cross-border policies has been progressively recognised since the décentralisation laws of 
1982. The competencies of the ‘deconcentrated’ administrations (local and regional 
prefectures) were transferred to ‘decentralised’ authorities (local and regional assemblies), 
and the latter were authorised to establish cross-border agreements with neighbouring sub-
national authorities. Between 1983 and 1990, the Delegation for the Exterior Action of Local 
Communities and the Bureau for Decentralised Co-operation appeared. In 1992 and 1995, two 
laws established the right of local and regional administrations to join cross-border 
institutions. Finally, in 1997 the Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action 
Régionale (DATAR, Delegation for Territorial Planning and Regional Action) created the 
Cross-border Operational Mission to network the decentralised authorities involved in a co-
operation programme.  
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In Spain, this process was more marked by disputes in a way not seen in France despite 
the transfers of competencies to the new 17 autonomous communities planned by the 1978 
Constitution. These regions fell into two categories: those that received extensive 
competencies ratified by referendum (Euskadi, Catalonia, Galicia and later Andalusia) and 
those that adopted the ordinary transitional status. The Constitution, however, only gave the 
regions the right to be informed of the external agreements of the state. As a result, the 
autonomous communities came up against the rigid position of the central state bureaucracy. 
After a long and bitter dispute, the Constitutional Court decided in 1994 that the Spanish 
Foreign Office exerted a monopoly on the hard core of foreign affairs, but that autonomous 
communities could draw up their own international policies provided that they were 
compatible with the interests of Spain (Burgorgue-Larsen, 1995: 108). 
The adoption of the Outline-Convention of Transfrontier Co-operation of 1980 and its 
Additional Protocol of 1995 by France and Spain supported this change. As the signing of a 
bilateral agreement between states was required for the Outline-Convention to be valid, a 
Franco-Spanish agreement was established in Bayonne in 1995.  
There are now two types of cross-border institutions in the Pyrenees: the intercommunal 
structures such as the Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi (1998, Hendaye, Irún and Hondarribia) 
and the Basque Eurocity Bayonne-San Sebastian (1995, from Bayonne to San Sebastian); the 
interregional structures such as the Common Fund Aquitaine-Euskadi (1989, which also 
brings together Aragón and Navarra), the Common Fund Aragón-Midi-Pyrénées (2001), the 
Euroregion Catalonia-Midi-Pyrenees-Languedoc-Roussillon (1991) and the Working 
Community of Pyrenees (WCP, 1983, all the Pyrenean regions and Andorra) (Harguindéguy, 
2004: 307-321). 
 
3.2. The INTERREG management: from the Centre to the Periphery  
 
In 1989, the Catalan presidency of the WCP presented a pilot project to the European 
Commission. Upon examination, the commissioners chose instead to finance the project 
proposed by the DATAR and the Ministerio de Obras Públicas (MOPU, Ministry of Public 
Works), even though it was managed by national governments. In 1990, INTERREG was re-
launched as a community initiative. It is not surprisingly that the state authorities such as the 
DATAR and its Pyrenean agency, the Pyrenean Planning Commission, the Prefecture of 
Midi-Pyrenees, the MOPU and the Spanish Treasury monitored the INTERREG I programme 
(31.22 million Ecu) (Morata and Muñoz, 1996: 195-219).  
After this very shaky start, the Commission doubled the INTERREG II grant (60.6 
million Ecu for the period 1994-1999) and urged the governments to get both sides of the 
border involved in the projects. Led by the Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees and the Spanish 
General Directorate of Treasury, cross-border working groups were created but their efforts 
were limited to putting forward suggestions. As a consequence, 90% of the INTERREG II 
projects were national projects with a simple certificate signed by a ‘partner’ located on the 
other side of the border. In addition, the Spanish state transferred the management of 
INTERREG II to the autonomous communities in 1996 while in France it remained a state 
programme.  
In order to remedy this situation, the European Commission modified the budget (€ 
173.88 million from 2000 to 2006: 30% for the French area, 70% for the Spanish regions) and 
the design of INTERREG. Moreover, in 1997, the dissolution of the French Parliament by the 
president J. Chirac provoked the election of a leftist government who delegated the 
management of INTERREG to the decentralised regional authorities. As member of the WCP, 
the president of the Conseil Régional of Aquitaine proposed himself as the monitoring 
authority of INTERREG France-Spain. The French Government is still represented by the 
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Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees and the Pyrenean Planning Commission. Cross-border co-
operation is compulsory because projects must first be sent to the monitoring authority to be 
financed by the payment authority (General Directorate of Community Funds of the Spanish 
Treasury). The eligible territories are NUTS III-level territories2 located in an Objective 2 
zone (maximum of 50% of ERDF financing): the French départements of Pyrénées-
Atlantiques, Hautes-Pyrénées, Haute-Garonne, Ariège and Pyrénées-Orientales; the Spanish 
provinces of Guipúzcoa, Navarra, Huesca, Gerona and Lerida. The examination of proposals 
is in the hands of three territorial committees of pre-programming (west, centre and east) 
which bring together French and Spanish sub-national authorities. The final decision on 
financing falls to a general committee of programming run by these authorities and the head 
of the INTERREG III-A service from the DG Regio. In order to avoid the implementation 
gap, new cross-border proposals must respect two rules (European Commission, 2000). First, 
partnership has to be implemented through three dimensions: a vertical one by involving 
different tiers of governance, a horizontal one by integrating public and private partners, and a 
transnational one by connecting French and Spanish actors. Second, the projects have to fit 
with the modern conception of territorial development promoted by the Commission by 
stressing the training and networking of local border actors. 
 
 
4. THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AS A FACTOR OF CONVERGENCE? 
 
Structural funds can be considered as a catalyser, viz a substance which accelerates the 
normal path of a chemical reaction. Actually, the configurations of the three case studies 
make them more or less receptive to the new framework designed by the European 
Commission (cf. map).  
 
4.1. The Western Case: Europeanisation through the local actors 
 
The first case concerns the three towns located around the bay of Txingudi, in the western 
Pyrenees, on the Atlantic coast of the Basque Country. Hendaye (France) is a family seaside 
resort of 12,600 inhabitants whose seaport now concentrates on tourist activities. On the 
opposite shore, Hondarribia (Spain) is a medieval citadel and a fishing seaport (15,000 
inhabitants). The main city of the bay, Irún (Spain), is an industrial town of 55,000 
inhabitants.  
The Bidasoa river separates Hendaye from its Spanish counterparts. It is also a border 
between the traditional Basque provinces of Labourd (Hendaye) and Guipúzcoa (Irún, 
Hondarribia), between the département of Pyrénées-Atlantiques (which the three French 
Basque provinces share with the Béarn) and the province of Guipúzcoa and between the 
Aquitaine region and the autonomous community of Euskadi.  
Hendaye is a traditional fief of the Parti Socialiste Français (PSF, French Socialist Party) 
within a département dominated by the liberal rightist Union pour la Démocratie Française 
(UDF, Union for the French Democracy) opposed to the socialist presidency of the region. 
Irún is also governed by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, Spanish Worker 
Socialist Party) when Hondarribia is ruled by the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV, Basque 
Nationalist Party) since the democratisation. The PNV traditionally leads the province of 
Guipúzcoa and the Basque Autonomous Community. 
These municipalities can be considered as ‘pro-active’ actors in cross-border issues as 
they founded a common intercommunal institution called Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi in 
1998 (Smyrl, 1995). It was the continuation of the Eurodistrict, an informal institution created 
in 1992 to which the Treaty of Bayonne of 1995 gave official backing. The Consorcio is 
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administered by a political committee of municipalities’ representatives. The technical aspects 
are in the hands of the Spanish private consultancy Bidasoa-Activa who implemented several 
initiatives such as a cross-border journal or a trade fair. 
The project proposed by these municipalities consists in supplying a suitcase of 
educational games to the pupils of the bay in order to complete their national training with 
cross-border information. This proposal shall cost € 213,000. It was presented on January 
2002 to the western territorial committee of pre-programming, who approved it in December. 
The committee of programming confirmed this decision on January 2003. It is the extension 
of a previous project which aimed to create tourist paths all around the bay. This project is 
locally managed by the Consorcio and Bidasoa-Activa. The latter appointed two societies 
specialised in tourist development: Maîtres du Rêve from Aix en Provence (France) and 
Zoocreative located in Bera de Bidasoa (Spain). Both developed the strategic and graphic 
aspects of the suitcases with the help of local professors through the cross-border working 
group specialised in cultural issues created by the Consorcio during the INTERREG II 
programme. The specifications imposed to design the educational suitcase were to focus on 
children aged between eight and ten and their families, with a pedagogical aim but in a light-
hearted way, in the three official languages of the Consorcio (Spanish, French and Basque). 
The strong link between the suitcase and the pedestrian paths also had to be stressed. Despite 
the local conflicts between the political representatives of Irún and Hondarribia on the 
toponymy to adopt (Basque or Spanish), the Franco-Spanish duo of tenders elaborated 
different educational tools such as a map, a card index for the teachers, a notebook, a CD 
Rom and a Trivial Pursuit Game about the natural and human patrimony of the border area. 
These elements correspond to the new roadsigns set out along the pedestrian paths which 
emphasise the importance of the different natural landscapes and monuments located around 
the bay. The project received the agreement of the French Ministry of Education and the 
Educational Department of the Basque Government. It also obtained the financial support of 
the Basque Government, the Conseil Général of Pyrénées-Atlantiques and the Conseil 
Regional of Aquitaine.  
 
4.2. The Central Case: Traditional State-centred Policies vs New Forms of Governance 
 
The second case study is based on a project implemented by the municipalities of Gèdre 
(France), Gavarnie (France), Torla (Spain) and Broto (Spain) in the central Pyrenees. Each of 
these hamlets concentrates approximately 200 inhabitants. Gavarnie and Gèdre have an easy 
access to the Gavarnie circus (1 million visitors a year) in the National Nature Reserve of 
Pyrenees and to some ski resorts, while Torla and Broto are the gateway to the Monte-Perdido 
(1.2 million visitors a year) in the National Nature Reserve of Ordesa. This situation eased the 
conversion from agricultural activities to the tourism trade during the 1970s.  
Unlike the other cases, these hamlets do not share a common culture. Gèdre and Gavarnie 
belong to the Occitan speaking Ancien Régime’s province of Bigorre, now located in the 
département of Hautes-Pyrénées in the Midi-Pyrénées region, while Torla and Broto are part 
of the Spanish-speaking area of the comarca (intercommunal district) of Sobrarbe, in the 
province of Huesca, in the autonomous community of Aragón.  
Following the pattern of Euskadi and Catalonia, aragonese nationalist parties have 
emerged in Aragón. Nevertheless, ‘Aragonism’ is still a regionalist movement and not a 
nationalist one. It did not impede the election of two state parties at the local level: the 
conservative Partido Popular (PP, Popular Party) in Torla and the PSOE in Broto as in the 
whole Aragonese community. On the French slope, Occitan nationalists are dedicated to 
cultural activities while centre-left traditional French political forces rule the municipality of 
Gèdre (Mouvement Radical de Gauche -Leftist Radical Movement- and PSF), the 
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département and the region. In turn, Gavarnie is ruled by the French conservative Union pour 
un Mouvement Populaire (UMP, Union for a Popular Movement). 
At the difference of the western case, municipal representatives are only ‘reactive’ actors 
as there is no tradition of cross-border projects in this area. Until 2000, few local cross-border 
projects were implemented, and most of them were managed through the DATAR-MOPU 
agreement (Smyrl, 1995). The only project led in co-operation between Torla, Borto, Gèdre 
and Gavarnie was the financing of an atlas about the local natural patrimony protected by the 
UNESCO.  
The project proposed by these municipalities is a feasibility study on the building of a 
telpher carrier between the four villages. The study costs € 153,000. It was presented in April 
2002 to the central territorial committee of pre-programming and approved by the territorial 
committee of programming in June 2002. These villages are 150 kilometres apart by the 
closest road and a telpher carrier could simplify the journey between the two slopes. It would 
prevent visitors of staying in just one resort, to the cost of the others, and could lengthen the 
season of the Spanish hotel keepers. There is no specific cross-border institution to manage 
this proposal. The leading authority is the Communauté de Communes (intercommunal 
grouping) Gavarnie-Gèdre, governed by the mayor of Gèdre. A parallel and unofficial local 
Franco-Spanish committee of management allows integrating the four municipalities. 
Although, the Spanish municipalities produced a first evaluation of the possibilities of 
transport across the border in the 1990s, entirely financed by the Aragonese Government, the 
members of the four town councils only began to organise local cross-border meetings on 
cross-border transport issues from 1999. After fourteen reunions it appeared that the easiest 
method to cross the border was to build a chair lift between the two slopes. Then, the French 
and Spanish representatives decided to inform their respective national authorities of their 
intention. In Spain, the Ministry of Public Works and the regional Government of Aragón 
only gave a symbolic backing to the project. In France, the regional Prefecture of Midi-
Pyrénées and the Pyrenean Planning Commission pushed the initiative forward through the 
ODIT-France. The latter represents the Ministry of Tourism and its regional delegation of the 
SGAR. This agency is specialised in mountain tourist logistic and supports the agents of the 
Communauté de Communes since the beginning to finance a first appraisal of the future 
works. Tenders were invited to propose technical solutions to the geographical constraints of 
the project. The French consultancy MC2 Consultants, located in Toulouse, was chosen. The 
MC2 consultants, helped by other French specialists on mountain infrastructures and 
environment sustainability tried to elaborate a planning scheme with the least negative 
environmental impact possible as the cable car should cross a part of the National Nature 
Reserve of the Pyrenees on the French slope. The results of the investigation concluded that it 
was possible to establish an infrastructure of communication between the two slopes but the 
National Nature Reserve’s board, which depends on the Ministry of Environment, imposed to 
finance new studies the economic and ecological repercussions of the project before to take a 
final decision.  
 
4.3. The Eastern Case: Unfinished Europeanisation 
 
The last case study consists in analysing the project established between the five hamlets of 
Estavar, Nahuja, Osséja, Saillagouse and Sainte-Léocadie (France - 9,000 inhabitants) and the 
town of Puigcerdà (Spain - 7,800 inhabitants). The economic activity of Puigcerdà is based on 
mountain agriculture and tourist services, as in the French villages, but the Spanish town also 
has some light industry.  
These neighbouring municipalities share a common historical territory called Cerdaña. 
Until the Treaty of the Pyrenees, Cerdaña was one of the provinces of Catalonia, which also 
Jean –Baptiste Harguindéguy 
8 
extends to the whole département of Pyrénées-Orientales. After 1659 both sides progressively 
separated (Sahlins, 1989). Nowadays, Spanish Cerdaña constitutes a comarca (district) which 
is part of the province of Gerona and the autonomous community of Catalonia. The French 
side is integrated to the département of Pyrénées-Orientales, within the Languedoc-Roussillon 
region.  
At that time, the French hamlets were ruled by different political formations but were 
mainly governed by socialist mayors, in a département traditionally ruled by the centre-left. 
However, since 1998, the Languedoc-Roussillon regional Council was dominated by the 
UMP thanks to the backing of the neo-fascist Front National (National Front). This 
configuration provoked many tensions with the Conseil Général of Pyrénées-Orientales until 
the election of a socialist president at the head of the region in 2003 (Alliès, 1998: 5-40). In 
Spain, the leftist Catalan nationalist mayor of Puigcerdà (Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya, ERC -Republican Left of Catalonia-) is in favour of the unifying of the Catalan-
speaking regions but was also very isolated in a province and a region controlled by the 
Catalan nationalist liberal/demo-Christian coalition Convergència I Unió (CiU, Convergence 
and Union). Nevertheless, a new alliance led by the PSOE, ERC and the ecologists was 
elected during the autonomous elections in 2003. 
As in the Basque case, there is a local tradition of individual local cross-border contacts. 
However, these ‘pro-active’ actors always met with difficulties to implement public projects 
involving territorial leaders, especially on the French part (Smyrl, 1995). According to this 
pattern, the proposal of cross-border hospital in Puigcerdà was put into service thanks to the 
backing of the Catalan Government since French leaders did not find an agreement. 
The proposal of these municipalities consists in networking the Museum of Cerdaña, 
located in Sainte-Léocadie, and the Cerdan Museum of Puigcerdà. The museums are managed 
in different ways. The five French municipalities co-operate through a common structure 
called Syndicat Intercommunal pour la Valorisation du Patrimoine Cerdan (SIVPC, 
Intercommunal Office for the Development of the Cerdan Culture) while the museum of 
Puigcerdá is administered by a Patronat which associates the town council and the comarca 
council. The principal aim of the project is to compete with Andorran ski resorts by 
diversifying local tourist activities. This project is the continuation of various proposals that 
have been implemented since the 1980s but which failed. In 1999, the new administration of 
the French museum proposed another agreement to the authorities of the Cerdan Museum. 
Both accepted to constitute a complementary collection, a unique ticket office and a common 
training programme for a total budget of € 1,874,615 with the Patronat as the leading 
authority of the project. Presented in January 2003, the proposal was accepted by the 
territorial committee of programming on September 2003. However, after a coup de theatre 
on June 2004, the committee reconsidered its decision and postponed sine die the adoption of 
the proposal. The main problems of the implementation process were first that although the 
aim of the museums was to promote the Cerdan culture, there always remained doubts about 
how to do so. While the French actors were in favour of the creation of a local tourist 
industry, their Spanish counterparts preferred to encourage the creation of a scientific centre 
for investigation. Second, the proposal of the regional Council to integrate the Museum of 
Cerdaña into the future Regional Nature Reserve of Occidental Pyrenees provoked the 
financial retraction of the Conseil Général. Actually, the latter proposed its financial 
assistance provided that the local actors excluded the other institution. In March 2005, the 
project was finally accepted for a total amount of € 745,323 financed by the regional 
Government of Catalonia on the Spanish side, the Conseil Général and the Conseil Régional 
on the French side. Nevertheless, the two museums had already established their budget on 
the precedent number and discovered that they had spent more in infrastructure than what 
they should get through the new INTERREG grant. This is especially true in the French 
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museum since the allocation of INTERREG III-A grant was modified in 2003 from a 50/50 
division between Spanish and French partners to a 70/30 division. Then, the realisation of the 
initial cross-border projects seems doomed to failure. 
 
 
5. INTERREG III-A FRANCE-SPAIN FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
By using the method of differences (Przeworski, Teune, 1970: 17) I aim to investigate what 
are the different outcomes of the implementation process and what causes such results. The 
comparison reveals that Europeanisation is a ‘differential’ process (Héritier, 2001) 
constrained by the contextual variables. In the case of INTERREG, the diffusion of European 
standards related to policy goals and governance depends on the capability of local actors to 
establish institutional arrangements. 
 
5.1. A Common Policy, Different Outcomes 
 
The three implementation processes can be compared according to two main features: first, 
the way in which the implementation is led, second, the policy goals which structure the three 
projects. For that, I use two theoretical tools. On one hand the policy networks’ approach 
developed by Roderick Rhodes and David Marsh (1992). On the other hand the cognitive 
analysis of public policies based on the notion of ‘référentiels’ elaborated by Pierre Muller 
and Bruno Jobert (1987). 
At the interactional level, the strong ideological and strategic integration of the western 
case fits with the model of ‘community network’ which is defined by a strong capability to 
isolate the internal participants from the external ones, the circulation of political resources 
between its different members, and a high vertical interdependency. This network involves 
different tiers of government on a vertical dimension, private and public actors interact on a 
horizontal dimension and French and Spanish actors participate on a transnational dimension. 
The central case can be analysed through the ‘professional network’ pattern which shares the 
same characteristics as the community network but has a lower capacity to cut off the internal 
and external aspects of the interaction. In this case, the vertical dimension of the network is 
dominated by the state administrations. The horizontal dimension is limited because there are 
no private actors involved and the transnational dimension is incomplete because the function 
of Spanish actors is limited to the symbolic support of the project. The eastern case runs like 
an ‘issue network’, where its members neither reach a minimal level of isolation, nor 
exchange their resources between themselves because of their low interdependency. The 
vertical involvement of different tiers of administration is a source of conflict, the horizontal 
integration of private actors does not work and the transnational dimension is restricted by the 
autonomous strategies of the two partners. 
At the ideational level, political representations are also divided. Two referentials appear 
through these three types of agencies. On the western side of the Pyrenees -and to a lesser 
extent on the eastern side-, French and Spanish actors agree on the financing of little projects 
which aim to conciliate tourist activities and the protection of environment. This local 
referential refers to a larger model which can be summarised using the term ‘modern 
development’. It means that the sub-national authorities can freely manage their own 
development projects on a global-territorial basis through a strong investment in the tertiary 
sector. In turn, the feasibility study project denotes the maintaining of an ‘old model of 
development’, based on the dirigisme of local policies by the central state, a sectoral approach 
to economic issues and a special focus on the financing of heavy infrastructures to 
industrialise the peripheries.  
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5.2. Drawing on the Sources of the INTERREG Implementation Process 
 
Many intervening variables can be invoked to explain the different outcomes of isolated cases 
of implementation of INTERREG III-A France-Spain. However, their comparison allows 
establishing a hierarchy of causality and inference. Three sets of causes can be invoked: those 
related to ideas, those linked to interests and those connected to institutions. 
With regard to the ideational variables, one of the commonplaces frequently encountered 
during the investigation is the constructive influence that a common culture exerts between 
two groups of actors involved in a cross-border policy. The positive example of the Basque 
co-operation seems to back this culturalist explanation. Even the actors engaged in the 
proposal of feasibility study agree thoroughly with this opinion by invoking their common 
mountain background. However, the difficulties of the Catalan policy prove that culture is not 
the perfect solution to cross-border issues.  
Local actors also invoke the internal capacity of cultures to favour the implementation 
process. Basques are often presented as well organised per se, while Occitan, Aragonese and 
Catalan people would be too individualistic to co-operate. Nevertheless, from an analytical 
viewpoint, cultural stereotypes are only an a posteriori rationalisation to justify a satisfactory 
-or unsatisfactory- outcome (Keating, 2003: 41-74). 
The geographical conditions would exert a pressure on the co-operation process too. 
Thus, one can directly explain the action of Basque actors in favour of a little project with a 
high cross-border value-added by the absence of physical borders. It also should be possible 
to explain the will of the actors of the feasibility study to finance heavy infrastructures by the 
presence of a physical barrier. Nevertheless, as the Catalan actors did not reach the same level 
of cross-border co-operation than the Basque ones when their geographical condition of open 
border areas does not radically differ, it invalidates this hypothesis.  
The basic needs of the actors and their socio-economic complementarities are also 
supposed to have a strong influence on the way in which the implementation is managed. 
However, the ‘success story’ of the western case economic demonstrates that a strong 
economic competition between municipalities has no effect on the cross-border co-operation 
policy which is, above all else, a political process (European Commission, 2002).   
In the same way, the proposal of the feasibility study seems to have a larger scope than 
the others. So, it should logically lead to the implication of the state services while the two 
other proposals should only involve local and regional actors. In fact, the cost of the 
feasibility study is lower than that of the networking of the museums. Moreover, it does not 
really differ from the educational suitcase since the latter also breaks the monopoly of the 
French and Spanish Ministries of Education by distributing new educational materials to the 
schools of the Txingudi bay. The main difference lies on the strategy led by the local actors. 
While in the case of the feasibility study the support of the state has been voluntarily required, 
the members of the Consorcio have tried to avoid the possible implication of state 
representatives.  
 
At the level of interests, the local leadership proved to be a fundamental aspect of the 
implementation process (Morata, 1995: 117-127). According to some actors, the presence of 
socialists in the first two cases on both sides of the Franco-Spanish border would facilitate the 
co-operation. In turn, the different political tendencies of the eastern case would explain the 
difficulties met during the implementation process. However, the transnationalisation of 
political parties does not intervene in this process because French and Spanish socialist parties 
have a very different history and are confronted to two different structures of political 
interests.  
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The political party of local leaders is also expected to play a role in the cross-border 
involvement. According to this explanation, Basque and Catalan nationalists, but also the 
socialist leaders would be more inclined to collaborate on a cross-border basis. But as proves 
the eastern case, the leadership of a pan-Catalan nationalist is not a sufficient factor to 
establish a good level of co-operation. In turn, the type of political leadership seems to have a 
greater influence on the co-operation. The ‘transformational leaders’ generally coincides 
better with the European standards than the ‘transactional leaders’, who merely manage the 
projects as classical national policies (Bailey, 1969; Burns, 1978). In the case of the 
Consorcio and the Patronat, the election of political entrepreneurs increased the symbolic 
European involvement of the towns. However, as a notable, the leader of the Communauté 
des Communes Gèdre-Gavarnie gave less pro-European discourses, but was more effective at 
the level of no-cross-border local politics thanks to his knowledge of regional clientelist 
networks.  
The skill levels of the local administrative staff also plays a key role in the mobilisation of 
the INTERREG III-A funds according to the European standards. The capability to evolve in 
an international context and to resolve the daily problems which arise during the co-operation 
is rather characteristic of ‘large’ local administrations, such as the Consorcio whose 
involvement in cross-border issues reinforced the learning process of their agents.  
The backing of the external actors for the project is also important. Firstly because the 
INTERREG III-A programme imposes a minimal level of public co-financing, only available 
due to the assistance of the provincial and regional administrations. Secondly, because the 
external actors also provide political resources (technical expertise, political support, etc.) 
which are essential in the implementation practice. This involvement can be a positive 
element if local agents are able to channel the peripheral actors. Conversely, this presence can 
also provoke the loss of local control over the implementation process as in the central case, 
or even the disintegration of the local agencies as in the eastern case.  
 
The role of institutional variables in the implementation process is linked to the stabilisation 
capacity of the actors’ networks (Powell, DiMaggio, 1991: 1-38). Nevertheless, all the 
institutional arrangements are not able to point the action of agencies towards the respect of 
European standards of implementation (Duran, 1992). According to the INTERREG 
implementations experienced in the three selected areas, the best administrative organisation 
must hold four necessary criteria:  
First, leading authorities have to be local institutions in the sense that they must represent 
effective interaction from a bottom-up perspective. This is the case of the three leading 
authorities. 
Second, leading authorities are more efficient when they are common institutions which 
represent both sides of the border. This is the case of the Consorcio, and this is also the case 
of the Intercommunal grouping of Gèdre-Gavarnie thanks to the help of the Franco-Spanish 
Committee created by the four municipal councils. A contrario, the Patronat can be 
considered as a smoke-screen since the two local partners of the eastern case do not really co-
operate. 
Third, the leading authorities with a legal backing are also the most legitimate. In all the 
cases, the leading authorities are legally recognised by their respective states, nevertheless, the 
Consorcio is recognised by the French and Spanish Ministries of Foreign Affairs since the 
ratification of the Treaty of Bayonne in 1995, imposed by the Outline-Convention of Madrid. 
Fourth, the leading authorities which hold a cross-border feature concurrently face fewer 
difficulties in the implementation of the structural funds in the way imposed by the European 
Commission. As is demonstrated by the example of the Consorcio, a specific administration 
designed to directly put into practice the Community policies is more flexible. The Consorcio 
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was created mainly to implement the European directives on cross-border policy. This 
efficiency is the consequence of the division of labour between the three town councils and 
these specialised structures in cross-border issues. In turn, the other leading authorities must 
work at the same time on their national affairs and on a cross-border programme. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
As this analysis underlines, the neo functionalist hypothesis which guides the European 
Commission is partly invalidated. The local level is fundamental, especially with regard to the 
implementation of large programmes such as INTERREG (Tannam, 1995: 67-93). Although 
the European Commission elaborated an even more constraining institutional framework, in 
some cases local actors continue to use the structural funds as a spur to implement traditional 
state-centred policies based on a productivist vision of development.  
This ‘calculus approach’ of historical new institutionalism tallies with this local focus by 
assuming that the correct implementation of the European programme could be improved 
through the creation of local specialised relays. From a theoretical point of view, actors act 
according to a rationalist pattern and try to maximise their position. The capability of actors to 
establish institutional arrangements permit the reduction of the transactional costs which they 
would have to pay without such structures. Therefore, the regulation of local agencies through 
institutional rules is the only way to force them to operate in a collective direction. Under 
certain conditions, institutions exert a stabilising effect on political actors, favour the learning 
process and reduce the uncertainty (Perkmann, 2002: 103-124; Smyrl, 1995). 
This rational choice/neo institutionalist analysis based on the study of cognitive and 
interactional aspects of the implementation of structural funds also reinforces the constitution 
of a consistent middle-range theory which goes across the traditional theories of integration. It 
adequately completes the neo functionalist corpus by stressing the importance of context in 
the diffusion process. Then, the spill-over is possible only if sub-national actors have an 
interest in doing so. Federalist works are concerned by the sub-national actors too. However, 
neo institutionalist analysis does not take for granted the growing importance of the regions 
and only can subscribe to a large and variable definition of multi-level governance. This 
interest for new modes of governance partly goes against the principal-agent model of 
intergovernmentalism by demonstrating the weight of intermediate institutions (local, 
regional, state-national) and the competition between state services. In the same way, this neo 
institutionalist study demonstrates that the theory of international political economy is too 
deterministic when it considers that the structural funds implicate automatically the setting of 
a virtuous dynamic of economic development in the peripheral territories. Many variables 
intervene in this process, especially in the border areas where two socio-political spaces 
encounter.  
 
 
                                                 
7. NOTES 
 
1
 The French and Spanish projects selected are separated by less than five kilometres, they aim to promote 
tourism through the development of natural and historical heritage, they are managed by public authorities and 
they cost less than € 800,000. However, the three cases have their own specificities. In the western case, actors 
are grouped into a transnational network, they share a common Basque culture, and they use a specific cross-
border institution to implement the INTERREG initiative at the local level. In the eastern case, actors form a 
cross-border network and they share a common Catalan culture. In the central case, the implementation only 
depends on a transnational network of political men and civil servants. The selection of these cases fulfils the 
needs of a comparative analysis by constituting a ‘jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive’ panel (Sartori, 
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1970: 1033-1053). The western case is effectively implemented according to the European standards; the second 
is also well implemented but the way in which the process is led does not fit with the European directives; the 
third is not implemented at all and has many difficulties to respect the expectations of the European 
Commission. 
2
 Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units): NUTS I 
include multi-regional territories; NUTS II are usually regions; NUTS III corresponds to provinces. 
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